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Introduction
Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death
be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive
lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears.
The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents
and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I will
argue that reecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an
Ockhamist account of future contingents according to which many of them are
true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true,
either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither
true nor false, face diculties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about
them. Reecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in
particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly
assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. Oftentimes, alternatives
to the Ockhamist account of future contingents are motivated by appeal to an
asymmetry in our mental attitudes about the past and the future: the future is
open and unknown in a way in which the past is not. I will argue that reecting
on wondering pulls in the opposite direction. Wondering about the future is
much like wondering about the past or the present. Just as when we wonder
whether it is presently raining in Glasgow, when we wonder whether it will rain
tomorrow, we assume there is a true, yet unknown answer to the question that
serves as the content of our wondering, and this is what makes our wondering
about the future appropriate.
In the rst section I briey set up the problem of future contingents and
summarize four dierent responses to the problem: Ockhamism, Falsism, Mid-
dlism, and Supervaluationism. In the second section, I consider wondering in
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general and present an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has
been recently proposed by Jane Friedman. Following Friedman, I outline some
norms governing wondering. In the third section, I consider what implications
the various responses to the problem of future contingents have for wondering
about future contingents. I argue that all accounts except Ockhamism face
diculties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them.
1 The Problem of Future Contingents and Re-
sponses
As the name suggests, a future contingent statement is a statement that ex-
presses a contingent proposition about the future. Discussions of future con-
tingents and the open future tend to focus on a certain sub-set of contingent
statements about the future: those considered to be presently unsettled. Typi-
cally, these are statements that involve a purportedly free action like:
(EGGS) Nicola will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow.
or a future event that is not determined by the past and present state of the
world and the laws of nature like:
(NA24) This sodium-24 atom will decay in the next 24 hours.1 2
I am doubtful that a theoretically neutral and informative account can be given
of what it is for a statement about the future to be presently settled or unsettled,
but given that all parties to the debate seem to agree that statements like
(EGGS) and (NA24) are the sort of statements at issue, I will focus on them as
paradigm examples of future contingents in what follows.3
The problem of future contingents arises from considering whether they are
true or false. Taking future contingents to be true or false raises the specter of
1Some dene a future contingent as a statement that is about a future undetermined event.
See Todd and Rabern (2019).
2Sodium-24 is a radioactive isotope of sodium that has a 15-hour half-life. Suppose here
and throughout the rest of the paper that the demonstrative phrase this sodium-24 atom in
(NA24) succeeds in picking out a specic atom of sodium-24 and that whether the atom will
decay in the next 24 hours is an indeterministic matter.
3There are problems with interpreting settledness in terms of determinism. Discussions of
the problems raised by future contingents have progressed independently of the determinism /
indeterminism debate. Some think that a deterministic world can still have an open future, at
least on some candidate ways of understanding what the openness of the future amounts to.
And that statements about future indeterministic events can have determinate truth-values.
See Torre (2011) for further discussion.
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fatalism. Consider the following representative argument that derives a fatalist
conclusion from premises about whether a future contingent is true or false:
1. Either (EGGS) is true or (EGGS) is false.
2. If (EGGS) is true, then (EGGS) is true now. If (EGGS) is false, then
(EGGS) is false now.
3. If (EGGS) is now true or (EGGS) is now false, then whether Nicola will
have eggs for breakfast tomorrow is now inevitable.
4. Therefore, whether Nicola will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow is now
inevitable.4
In this paper, I am not interested in evaluating this argument per se, but rather
in looking at one of the implications of a popular response that involves rejecting
Premise (1). Premise (1) follows from the Principle of Bivalence:
(Bivalence) Every proposition is either true or false (and not both).
I will divide approaches to future contingents into those that accept bivalence
for future contingents and those that reject it. Two approaches that accept
bivalence are Ockhamism and Falsism. The Ockhamist maintains that all future
contingents are either true or false and accepts that many future contingents
are true.5 The Ockhamist maintains that there is a single, actual future, where
this is understood as the claim that for future contingents of the form `It will
be the case that p', either `It will be the case that p' is true or `it will be the
case that not-p' is true. According to the Ockhamist, either it is true that there
will be a sea battle tomorrow or it is true that there will not be a sea battle
tomorrow.6 Statements involving `will' are evaluated in much the same way as
statements involving `was'. If we take φ to be an atomic formula and we take F
to denote the future-tense operator `It will be the case one day hence' and `t+1'
to denote `one day later than time t', then the Ockhamist maintains that:
 Fφ is true at t i φ is true at t+1.
4This argument is adapted from Markosian (1995). Similar arguments can be found in
Cameron and Barnes (2008), Tooley (1997), and Diekemper (2007).
5The Ockhamist, unlike the Falsist, endoreses Future Excluded Middle: Either it will be
the case that p or it will be the case that not p.
6For the purposes of this paper, I take `Ockhamism' to be a label for the view stated here:
acceptance of bivalence for future contingents and there is a single, actual future in the sense
outlined. The label `Ockhamism' refers to dierent views in the future contingents literature.
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 Fφ is false at t i φ is false at t+1.
So, on Wednesday, (EGGS) is true just in case Nicola has eggs for breakfast
on Thursday. Various metaphysical accounts of time are compatible with the
Ockhamist account of future contingents. What they have in common is that
there is a single privileged way that things will go. One metaphysical account
compatible with Ockhamism is the block universe, eternalist account according
to which past, present, and future objects and events all exist in a non-branching
block of spacetime. A theorist who adopts a branching metaphysics of the future
could adopt Ockhamism assuming that there is one branch that is privileged
over all the others, the branch that is, or represents, how things will actually
go.7 Presentists and growing block theorists can also endorse an Ockhamist
account of future contingents assuming they take there to be a single, privileged
way that the future will go.8
Falsism also accepts bivalence, however unlike Ockhamism, denies that any
future contingents are true. Broadly speaking, there are two distinct motivations
for Falsism that have been defended in the literature. The rst is that statements
involving `will' like (EGGS) and (NA24) are equivalent in meaning to modal
statements like `will denitely'. Arthur Prior puts forth this account calling it a
`Peircean' account after Charles Sanders Peirce.9 Discussing future contingents
like (EGGS) and (NA24), Prior writes:
`Will' here means `will denitely'; `It will be that p' is not true until
it is in some sense settled that it will be the case, and `It will be that
not p' is not true until it is in some sense settled that not-p will be
the case. If the matter is not thus settled, both these assertions, i.e.
[It will be the case that p] and [It will be the case that not P] are
simply false. . . (Prior 1967: 129).
Such a view claims that all future contingents are false precisely because future
contingent statements amount to the claim that a contingent event in the future
will denitely occur. Only claims about the future that are true in all ways the
future may go, such as `It will be the case that the sodium-24 atom decays or does
not decay in the next 24 hours' are true. The view upholds bivalence for future
contingents because every future contingent is false and thereby either true or
7This sort of view has been termed by Belnap and Green (1994) as the `thin red line'
8What they take the truthmakers for future contingents to be is another matter. See
Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) for an Ockhamist growing block account.
9Although as Todd (2016) points out, C. S. Peirce didn't endorse the account.
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false. However, unlike the Ockhamist, it rejects Future Excluded Middle: either
it will be the case that p or it will be the case that not p, since both disjuncts
are false.
Falsism has most recently received a thorough defense by Patrick Todd.10
Todd, however, motivates Falsism using dierent reasons from those developed
by Prior; he denies that `will' statements are equivalent in meaning to `denitely
will' statements. Instead, Todd takes the inspiration for his view to be Bertrand
Russell's analysis of sentences involving non-denoting denite descriptions like
`The present king of France is bald'. Famously, whereas Peter Strawson denies
bivalence for such sentences claiming that they lack truth-value, Russell claims
that they are false because they falsely claim the existence of a unique present
king of France.11 Analogously, Todd claims that future contingent statements
like (EGGS) and (NA24) are to be understood as presupposing a unique actual
future. Todd states that to say that something will happen (in this mode) is
simply to say that it belongs to the unique actual future, not that the thing
is determined to happen (Todd 2016: 14). So (EGGS) is to be analyzed as:
There is a unique actual future in which Nicola has eggs for breakfast. Todd
denies that there is a unique actual future and takes this denial to be required
for preserving an open future. Since there is no unique actual future and part
of the semantics of (EGGS) is that there exists a unique actual future, (EGGS)
is false. All future contingents contain a false claim that there is a single actual
future, and are thereby false.
I will consider two approaches that reject bivalence. One such approach is
a three-valued logic approach perhaps most associated with Jan ukasiewicz
(1970), and more recently defended by Tooley (1997) and Bourne (2004), that I
will call Middlism. In a passage that clearly summarizes his approach to future
contingents, ukasiewicz writes:
I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at
a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is at
the present time determined neither positively or negatively. Hence
it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in Warsaw
at the given time. On this assumption the proposition I shall be in
Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year can at the present
10`Falsism' is my label for the view, not Todd's. Todd presents and defends the view in
his (2016). Todd cites as precursors for Falsism Hartshorne (1941), (1964) and Prior (1957),
(1967).
11Russell (1905), Strawson (1950).
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time be neither true nor false. For if it were true now, my future
presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which is contra-
dictory to the assumption. If it were false now, on the other hand,
my future presence in Warsaw would have to be impossible, which
is also contradictory to the assumption. Therefore the proposition
considered is at the moment neither true nor false ... (ukasiewicz
1930, 53).
This approach rejects bivalence for future contingents and also the Law of Ex-
cluded Middle which states that for every proposition, p, either p or not-p. This
approach introduces a third truth-value that I will call middle. Future contin-
gents like (EGGS) and (NA24) are neither true nor false, but rather middle.
Assigning an intermediate truth-value to such claims is intended to capture the
idea that such statements are at the present time determined neither positively
or negatively (ukasiewicz 1930: 53). So the Middlist rejects Premise (1) of
the above argument. The lesson to be learned from future contingents is that
they are neither true nor false but instead possess an intermediate truth-value.
Perhaps the most popular approach to future contingents that rejects biva-
lence is Supervaluationism.12 A Supervaluationist approach to future contin-
gents is most fully developed by Richmond Thomason (1970, 1984). Superval-
uationism for future contingents is applied to a branching time model in which
there are multiple distinct futures and furthermore no one future is privileged
in any way over any other. Consider the simplied example diagrammed below:
12In addition to Thomason, I include Macfarlane (2003), (2008), (2014) under this label
even though he adopts a Relativist account of future contingents. The reason I include him
under the label of Supervaluationism for the purposes of this discussion is because the question
we are considering is whether it is appropriate to wonder about a future contingent before the
occurrence of the event described by the future contingent. Macfarlane's account relativizes
truth of future contingents to a context of use and a context of assessment. The truth-
value of a statement about the future is arrived at by supervaluating over all histories that
include the context of use and the context of assessment. When the context of assessment
coincides with the context of use, the truth-conditions for an utterance will be the same as the
Supervaluationist truth-conditions, and so, to the extent that I think that Supervaluationism
faces a problem regarding wondering about future contingents at the context of use, these
problems apply equally to MacFarlane's account. Making truth of future contingents relative
to context of use and context of assessment is intended to accommodate retrospective accuracy
judgments: judgments after the event described in the utterance has occurred.
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The branching model consists of histories: a history is a complete linear
ordering of moments past, present and future; a particular tracing through
the branching tree structure from trunk to branch tip. The diagram in Figure 1
represents a branching future containing three distinct histories: h1, h2, and h3.
Suppose m1 is a moment on Wednesday and we are considering what Nicola will
have for breakfast tomorrow morning. In h1 she has Cheerios for breakfast, in h2
she has eggs, and in h3 she has porridge. Suppose Peter produces an utterance
of (EGGS) at m1 on Wednesday. m1 is equally part of multiple histories: h1,
h2, and h3. Truth-values for future contingents are arrived at through a two-
step process.13 The rst step involves assigning satisfaction conditions to such
statements relative to each history. This proceeds by applying tense-operators
relative to each history in line with the Ockhamist account. If we take φ to be
an atomic formula and we take F to denote the future-tense operator `It will be
the case one day hence' and `m+1 in h' to denote `one day later than moment,
m, in history, h', then:
 Fφ is satised at m in h i φ is satised at m+1 in h.
 Fφ is unsatised at m in h i φ is unsatised at m+1 in h.
In our example, (EGGS) is satised in h2 and fails to be satised in h1 and h3
because Nicola has eggs for breakfast in h2 and not in h1 and h3. The second
step of the process involves supervaluating over histories. A statement is true
at m just in case it is satised in every history that contains m:
 Fφ is true at m i for every h that contains m, Fφ is satised at m in h.
13Given the two-step process, there are various terminological choices that can be made in
how to dene the truth-predicate for Supervaluationism. My presentation follows Todd and
Rabern's (2019, 3-4) presentation.
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 Fφ is false at m i for every h that contains m, Fφ is unsatised at m in
h.
 Otherwise, Fφ is neither true nor false at m.
In our example, the utterance of (EGGS) at m1 is neither true nor false since it
is not satised at m1 in every history that contains m1 and not unsatised at
m1 in every history that contains m1. It is satised at m1 in h2 and unsatised
at m1 in h1 and h3. Interestingly, even though the utterance of (EGGS) is
neither true nor false at m1, an m1 utterance of `Either Nicola will have eggs for
breakfast tomorrow or it is not the case that Nicola will have eggs for breakfast
tomorrow' is true at m1. It is true at m1 because it is satised by every history
that contains m1. Future contingents are those statements that are satised in
some histories and unsatised in others. So, all future contingents, like (EGGS)
and (NA24), are neither true nor false on the Supervaluationist account.14
2 Wondering
In this section I consider the psychological attitude of wondering whether, for
example, wondering whether John Glenn ew in the Apollo 11 mission, wonder-
ing whether it is currently raining in Glasgow, or wondering whether there will
be a sea battle tomorrow.15 I draw heavily on Jane Friedman's recent work on
interrogative attitudes. I also outline some norms for wondering whether that
follow on from her account.
According to Friedman (2013), wondering is one of several attitudes, like
inquiring, investigating, and suspending judgment, that she calls `interrogative
attitudes'. She argues that such interrogative attitudes have questions as their
contents. Consider the sentence `Peter wonders whether Nicola will have eggs
for breakfast tomorrow'. It is standard to take the interrogative complement
`whether Nicola will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow' to have a question as
14Like the Middlist, the Supervaluationist maintains that future contingents are neither
true nor false, but unlike the Middlist, also maintains that truth and falsity are the only
truth-values. On Supervaluationism, future contingents are gappy rather than possessing a
third truth-value. Another substantial dierence between the two views is that, where φ is
a future contingent, Fφ ∨ ¬Fφ is true according to Supervaluationism, yet neither true nor
false according to Middlism. This may well be seen as an advantage of the Supervaluationist
approach to future contingents over the Middlist approach. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for emphasizing these dierences.
15I will take the italicised wondering whether to denote the psychological attitude and will
keep it unitalicised when using it in an interrogative phrase or sentence.
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its semantic content. Friedman argues that, similarly, we should take the men-
tal content of interrogative attitudes to be questions. Whereas the content of
Moira's belief that it is raining in Glasgow is a proposition: that it is raining
in Glasgow, the content of Aidan's wondering whether it is raining in Glasgow
is not a proposition, but a question: Is it raining in Glasgow?.
What exactly are questions? There is no general agreement on the meta-
physics of questions and fortunately, exactly what questions are need not con-
cern us. I will follow Friedman in assuming that questions are not propositions
(Friedman 2013: 150). Some take questions to be sets of propositions, where the
set of propositions consists of all the possible answers to the question. Others
take questions to be open propositions.16
Regardless of which metaphysical account of questions we adopt, we can
introduce some basic features of questions and answers. Consider the following
example questions:
A. Who ew in the Apollo 11 mission to the moon?
B. Did Barak Obama visit Cuba as president?
Questions have possible answers where answers can be understood as proposi-
tions.17 So the following are all possible answers to A:
a. Neil Armstrong ew in the Apollo 11 mission.
b. Only Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Buzz Aldrin ew in the
Apollo 11 mission.
c. Fidel Castro ew in the Apollo 11 mission.
We can distinguish between true and false answers to a question. Both a and
b are true answers to A, and c is a false answer to A. Furthermore, a is a true
partial answer to A, whereas b is a true complete answer to A: b completely and
truly answers A: it states that Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Buzz Aldrin
ew in the Apollo 11 mission and no one else did. True, complete answers are
the logically strongest true answers entailing all partial answers.
16See Friedman (2013: 152-153) for discussion and references of various accounts of what
questions are.
17There is some debate over what sorts of entities answers can be. Some claim that answers
can be individuals, and so Angela Merkel can serve as the answer to the question: Who is the
current Chancellor of Germany? (e.g. Tichy 1978). I will presuppose here that answers to
questions are always propositions.
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`Yes/No' questions like B are called `polar questions'. They have two possible
answers. The phrase `wonders whether' embeds either a polar question or a
question with a nite number of possible answers. Consider the sentence `Peter
wonders whether Obama visited Cuba as president'. The semantic content of
the `wonders whether' phrase is a polar question: Did Obama visit Cuba as
president? And the true complete answer to the question is the proposition
that Obama visited Cuba as president. Wondering whether attitudes are just
one species of wondering attitudes: we wonder why, wonder what, wonder when,
wonder who, wonder where. In considering future contingents, I will focus on
polar, wonders whether questions: wondering whether Nicola will have eggs for
breakfast tomorrow and wondering whether the sodium-24 atom will decay in
the next 24 hours.
Following Friedman, let us say that a question Q is sound at world w i
there is a proposition that truly and completely answers Q at w (Friedman
2013: 151). Henceforth I will introduce the following notation: I will reserve
uppercase italicized letters to denote questions and lowercase italicized letters
to denote propositions. Where Q is a question and a is a proposition, I will use
the notation `Q(a)' to denote a true, complete answer to Q.
Friedman provides a compelling case for the existence of certain norms gov-
erning interrogative attitudes. At rst pass, it seems problematic to claim that a
subject knows Q 's true, complete answer but continues to have an interrogative
attitude with Q as its content. For example it seems epistemically inappropri-
ate to know that Obama visited Cuba as president and also to wonder whether
Obama visited Cuba as president. Such cases are possible, for example, if I
wonder where my keys are and then upon nding them in my coat pocket, I
think to myself `Silly me, I knew they were there!' Friedman notes, however that
such cases are not `epistemically happy' ones.18 These considerations motivate
what she terms the Ignorance Norm (IN) for interrogative attitudes (here I've
slightly modied it to take into account the notation I introduced for questions
and their true, complete answers):
(IN) Necessarily, if one knows Q(a) at t, then one ought not have an
18Friedman (2017: 310). A complication arises when we consider Frege puzzle cases. For
example, I may know that Hesperus is a planet, yet wonder whether Phosphorus is a planet and
my wondering in such a case may seem appropriate. If we take the content of my knowledge
to be a singular proposition containing Venus and the property of being a planet it seems that
I know the true, complete answer to the question: Is Phosphorus a planet? I think there are
ways of modifying (IN) to accommodate such cases, perhaps by taking into account the guise
under which the true, complete answer is known. Alternatively, one could maintain that my
wondering in such cases is indeed inappropriate, yet excusable.
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interrogative attitude towards Q at t (Friedman 2017: 311).
Given that my focus in this paper is on wondering whether with polar questions
as their content, we can state an ignorance norm for wondering whether that is
entailed by (IN) as follows:
(WIN1) Necessarily, if one knows Q(a) at t, then one ought not wonder
whether Q at t.
(WIN1) seems very plausible. Wondering whether Obama visited Cuba as pres-
ident is inappropriate in a case in which I know that Obama visited Cuba as
president. It's possible for me to do both, but it's not an epistemically happy
position to be in. Once I know the true, complete answer to the question, I
ought to stop wondering whether Obama visited Cuba as president.19
In what follows, I will assume that if a proposition, a, is a true, complete
answer to a question Q, then the proposition that a is true is also a true,
complete answer to Q.20 For example, if the proposition Obama visited Cuba as
president is a true, complete answer to the question Did Obama visit Cuba as
president?, then the proposition `Obama visited Cuba as president' is true is also
a true, complete answer to the question.21 So, applying (WIN1), if one knows
`Obama visited Cuba as president' is true, then one ought not wonder whether
Obama visited Cuba as president. Similarly, if not-a is a true, complete answer
to a question Q, then the proposition that a is false is also a true, complete
answer to Q. For example, if the proposition that it is not currently raining
in Glasgow is a true, complete answer to the question Is it currently raining
19The `ought' in (IN) and (WIN1) (as well as (WIN2) below) is to be understood as an
epistemic 'ought' and my talk of wondering being appropriate or inappropriate here and
throughout the paper is also to be understood in an epistemic sense. A potential worry:
aren't there cases where one knows Q(a) but it's nonetheless appropriate to wonder whether
Q? Jay knows that he turned the stove o, yet he wonders whether he did, and goes back
inside to double-check. Isn't Jay's double-checking epistemically virtuous? Might we praise
his tendency to wonder despite knowing as benecial in the long run, perhaps leading him
to act appropriately on other occasions where he fails to know and indeed left the stove on?
Friedman considers and replies to such worries in (2017, 312-13). She writes "There may
be some sense in which it is epistemically appropriate to inquire despite knowing in some
sorts of cases. My claim though is that there is some sense in which it is not. The subject
who inquires while she knows will be doing something epistemically inappropriate, but not
necessarily everything" (312).
20On some accounts of propositions, such as the possible worlds account, a and a is true
may be the same proposition, in which case there is no need for a further assumption. For
the purposes of this paper, I try to stay as neutral as possible regarding various accounts of
what propositions are.
21Here and in similar expressions in what follows, I take 'Obama visited Cuba as president'
is true to be shorthand for The proposition expressed by 'Obama visited Cuba as president'
is true.
11
in Glasgow? then the proposition `It is raining in Glasgow' is false is also a
true, complete answer to the question. In general, for polar, wonders whether
questions, knowledge of the truth-value of the target proposition is knowledge
of a true, complete answer to the question.
3 Wondering about Future Contingents
In what follows, I will consider the three alternatives to Ockhamism: Falsism,
Middlism, and Supervaluationism, and argue that each faces diculties in ac-
counting for the appropriateness of wondering about future contingents.
3.1 Falsism
If we accept (WIN1) and we accept Falsism, then it follows that wondering
about future contingents is inappropriate; we ought not wonder about them.
To raise the stakes, suppose that an evil scientist tells me that he will torture
me horribly for ve days i (NA24) is true and send me on a wonderful ve-
day holiday i (NA24) is false. Such a predicament would concern me greatly.
I would undoubtedly lie awake at night wondering whether (NA24) is true or
false. I would hope that it is false and fear that it is true. On the current
framework, the question that serves as the content of my wondering is Will the
sodium-24 atom decay in the next 24 hours? Let us call this question `N '.
Falsism seems to oer a therapy. In accepting the theory, I come to know
that (NA24) is false. Falsism provides the true, complete answer to the question
N. The true, complete answer is that It is false that the sodium-24 atom will
decay within the next 24 hours. So, according to (WIN1) it is inappropriate for
me to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay.22 But I do continue to
22This may overstate my epistemic position with respect to (NA24). In any case, in ac-
cepting Falsism, I ought to accept that (NA24) is false. If I believe outright that (NA24) is
false, it also seems that I ought not wonder whether (NA24) is true or false. This follows
from the attractive idea that to believe a proposition outright is to treat it as if one knows it
(Williamson 2000: 46-47). If I were to instead assign a high credence to Falsism, say .80, this
seems compatible with wondering whether (NA24) is true or false, however it leads to other
diculties. In assigning a credence of .80 to Falsism, I should assign (at least) a credence of
.80 to the proposition that (NA24) is false, and, assuming, as we are, that the evil scientist's
promise is sincere, I should assign a credence of (at least) .80 to the proposition that I will go
on holiday. The more condent I become of Falsism, the more condent I should be that I
will go on holiday and avoid torture! I put aside the interesting question of what implications
partial belief in Falsism and other theories of future contingents have for wondering about the
future. Thank you to Uri Liebowitz and an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
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wonder, and my wondering certainly seems appropriate. This raises a problem
for Falsism.23
It is useful to consider the reasons for why Falsists claim that future contin-
gents are all false in order to get more insight into implications for wondering
about future contingents like (NA24). Recall from Section 1 that Prior and
Todd provide very dierent motivations for Falsism. Prior understands `will'
in statements like (NA24) to mean `will denitely' or `it is now settled that it
will' and he contends that it is false that the sodium-24 atom will denitely
decay in the next 24 hours (and it is also false that the sodium-24 atom will
denitely not decay in the next 24 hours). Because the decay of the atom is
entirely indeterministic, there are some futures in which it decays and some in
which it does not. If Prior's Peircean analysis of future contingents is right,
then given the indeterministic setup of our sodium-24 atom, we do know the
true, complete answer to the question N ; we know that it is not the case that
the sodium-24 atom denitely will decay in the next 24 hours. So, according to
(WIN1), we ought not wonder about (NA24). The fact that it is appropriate to
wonder suggests that Prior's analysis mischaracterizes the content of our won-
dering: to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay in the next 24 hours
is not to wonder whether it denitely will or whether it is now settled that it
will. The fact that I can know now that it is not denite or settled that it will
(or won't) decay, yet still wonder whether it will decay, strongly suggests that
Prior's Peircean analysis of future contingents is wrong.
As noted above, Todd's defense of Falsism diers signicantly from Prior's.
Todd does not take the falsity of future contingents to be rooted in the fact
that `will' is equivalent in meaning to `will denitely' or `it is now settled that
it will'. Rather he claims that `will' statements presuppose the existence of
a unique actual future. Todd claims that future contingent statements of the
form `It will be the case that p' are to be anaylzed as: `The unique actual future
features p' (Todd 2016: 16). The reason that all future contingents are false
on Todd's account is because it is false that there is a unique actual future.
Following a Russellian analysis of non-denoting denite descriptions, it is false
that there will be a sea battle tomorrow because it is false that there is a unique
23Whereas I raise here a `forward-looking' tension between Falsism and interrogative atti-
tudes, an anonymous referee suggests a `backwards-looking' tension as well. Suppose it is the
next day and I learn that the atom has decayed. According to Falsism, yesterday's armative
answer to the question Will the sodium-24 atom decay in the next 24 hours? was false (since
it was then unsettled how things would turn out). But it seems problematic to claim both that
the atom has decayed and yesterday's armative answer to the question Will the sodium-24
atom decay in the next 24 hours? was false. Thanks to the anonymous referee for this point.
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actual future that features one.
So, on Todd's analysis, to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay
in the next 24 hours is to wonder whether the unique, actual future contains
the decay of the sodium-24 atom. On our current framework, the question
that serves as the content of my wondering whether attitude would be Does
the unique actual future contain the decaying of the sodium-24 atom? Given
Todd's commitment to the nonexistence of a unique actual future, the question
falsely presupposes a unique actual future. With respect to questions like this,
there are two approaches available: a Russellian approach and a Strawsonian
approach.24 I will consider each and argue that both entail that if, as Todd
claims, there is no unique actual future, then wondering about future contingents
is inappropriate. Suppose Arthur wonders whether the present king of France is
bald. Extending the Russellian analysis, the question that serves as the content
of Arthur's interrogative attitude, Is the present king of France bald?, does have
a true, complete answer.25 The true, complete answer is: There does not exist
a present king of France.26 Once Arthur learns that there is no present king of
France, it is no longer appropriate for him to wonder whether the present king of
France is bald. On the Russellian analysis, this inappropriateness follows from
(WIN1), since learning that there is no present king of France involves learning
the true, complete answer to the question. The same applies to wondering about
future contingents on Todd's account. The question that serves as the content of
my wondering about (NA24) has a true, complete answer: There does not exist
a unique, actual future. In embracing Todd's account, I come to know the true,
24As far as I know, neither Russell nor Strawson applied their theory of non-denoting denite
descriptions to questions although I think the applications I suggest in what follows are natural
extensions of their respective theories to the framework of interrogative attitudes that we are
working with here.
25The Russellian analysis faces a problem when applied to wondering whether attitudes
containing non-denoting denite descriptions. This has been pointed out by Elbourne (2010).
It seems that the Russellian analysis would take the content of Hans' wondering whether the
ghost in the attic is making a mess to be the question: Is there a unique ghost in the attic and is
it making a mess? But this seems to mischaracterize Hans' wondering. Hans isn't wondering
whether there exists a unique ghost in his attic. If wondering whether attitudes raise a problem
for the Russellian analysis of non-denoting denite descriptions, Todd's account inherits this
problem. That Todd's account faces this problem has been pointed out by Rabern and
Schoubye (2017). But this problem is distinct from the one I highlight here. Here I assume
the correctness of the analysis and show that it makes wondering about future contingents
inappropriate.
26On the Russellian analysis, what are the possible answers to the question that serves as
the content of Arthur's wondering? It seems that there are three: there exists a present king
of France and he is bald, there exists a present king of France and he is not bald, and there
does not exist a present king of France. The last is the question's true, complete answer at
the actual world.
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complete answer to the question that serves as the content of my wondering and
so, by (WIN1), it is inappropriate for me to continue to wonder about it.
According to Strawson, the proposition that the present king of France is bald
presupposes the proposition that the present king of France exists because if the
former proposition is true or false, the latter proposition is true. Since the latter
proposition is false, Strawson claims that the proposition that the present king
of France is bald is neither true nor false. Extending the Strawsonian analysis
to questions, the question that serves as the content of Arthur's interrogative
attitude, Is the present king of France bald?, contains a false presupposition.
Just as the statement The present king of France is bald is neither true nor false
because it contains a false presupposition, the question Is the present king of
France bald? lacks a true, complete answer and is thereby unsound.27 Sup-
pose one learns that the question that serves as the content of one's wondering
contains a false presupposition in the Strawsonian sense. Is it appropriate to
continue to wonder about it? It seems that it is not. Friedman plausibly notes
the inappropriateness of maintaining an interrogative attitude in cases where
one learns that the question has a false presupposition. She writes:
To start, there are some cases in which suspension of judgment be-
comes epistemically inappropriate exactly when further inquiry does.
The view being proposed here can give a straightforward explana-
tion of those cases. For instance, say that at w, the world of inquiry,
S realizes that Q has some false presupposition or is similarly un-
sound, e.g., Q = What colour was Thomas Jeerson's Ferrari? (and
w is the actual world). When S discovers that Q is faulty in this
way, it looks as though further inquiry into Q would be irrational
or otherwise epistemically inappropriate. But in this sort of case
continuing to suspend about Q seems to be inappropriate as well,
and in much the same way. If you know that Jeerson didn't have
a Ferrari then suspending judgment about what colour his Ferrari
was looks inappropriate (Friedman 2017, 315-16).
Here Friedman is discussing suspension of judgment, but I think the very same
considerations apply to wondering whether. If I am wondering whether Thomas
Jeerson's Ferrari was red and subsequently learn that my wondering contains
a false presupposition, it seems inappropriate for me to continue to wonder
27A similar extension of the Strawsonian account of presupposition to questions is provided
by Belnap and Steel (1976: 109-21).
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whether Thomas Jeerson's Ferrari was red. These considerations motivate
another norm for wondering whether: that it is inappropriate to wonder whether
in cases where one learns that the question that serves as the content of one's
wondering is unsound.
(WIN2) Necessarily, if one knows at t that Q is unsound, then one ought not
wonder whether Q at t.28
In sum, if future contingents presuppose the existence of a unique actual future
and no unique actual future exists, then it would be inappropriate to continue to
wonder about them if we learn that there is no unique actual future. Following
Todd's extension of the Russellian analysis of non-denoting denite descriptions,
it would be inappropriate to continue to wonder about them because learning
that there is no unique actual future involves learning their true, complete an-
swer. If we instead adopt a Strawsonian analysis, it turns out that the questions
that serve as the contents of our wonderings about future contingents are un-
sound, and in coming to know this, we ought not wonder about them. So if
future contingents presuppose a unique actual future and no such future exists,
once we accept this, it is no longer appropriate to wonder about them.
How might the Falsist respond? Perhaps they could respond that wondering
about future contingents is fundamentally dierent than wondering about past
and present propositions. Although (WIN1) and (WIN2) apply in the case of
wondering about past and present propositions, they do not apply in the case of
wondering about future contingents. Wondering about future contingents is a
sui generis kind of wondering and has a distinctive normative prole. However,
considerations motivating (WIN1) and (WIN2) for wondering about the past
and present also motivate (WIN1) and (WIN2) for wondering about the future.
An assertion of `I know it is false that Biden will visit Cuba tomorrow and I
wonder whether he will' sounds as bad as `I know it is false that Biden visited
Cuba yesterday and I wonder whether he did'.29 Similarly, the motivations
for (WIN2) appear as strong for propositions about the future as they do for
propositions about the past and the present. If I learn, contrary to what I had
previously believed, that Biden will not buy a Ferrari, I should stop wondering
28Perhaps this is too strong, although it could be restricted to questions that are unsound
in virtue of containing a false Strawsonian presupposition in the sense outlined above.
29Friedman uses similar examples to motivate (IN). She writes that assertions like `I know
whether Bob went to the party, but I wonder whether he went' sound awful (Friedman 2017,
309). Note that I know whether Bob will go to the party, but I wonder whether he will also
sound bad. Cf. Fabrizio Cariani's discussion of what he terms Future Might Contradictions
(Cariani, forthcoming, 96-99).
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what color Ferrari he will buy. Furthermore, there clearly seems to be something
defective about knowing that there is no single actual future and continuing
to wonder whether the single actual future contains the decay of the sodium-
24 atom. Rather than nding evidence of a sui generis normative prole for
wondering about future contingents, we instead nd evidence to the contrary:
that they are governed by the same norms.
Another way that the proponent of Falsism could respond is by claiming
that I have mischaracterized the content of the relevant wondering whether
attitudes. The semantics for future contingents is the Falsist semantics, but
this need not mean that the content of wondering whether for future contingents
is to be interpreted in this way. (NA24) is false, but when I wonder whether
the sodium-24 atom will decay, the content of my wondering is not a question
about the truth-value of (NA24); it is some other sound question such that I
do not know its true, complete answer and it is thereby appropriate for me to
wonder about it. This seems like a very unstable position. The question lurking
in the background is: what is the content of the relevant question and why is
there such a disconnect between the semantics for future contingents and the
content of my wondering whether attitudes about them? 30 To the extent that
such considerations motivate adopting an alternative content for the relevant
wondering whether attitude, they seem to also motivate adopting an alternative
semantic content for future contingents. At the very least, it would be preferable
for a theory to maintain that the semantic content of future contingents also
serves as the target proposition of corresponding wondering whether attitudes
concerning future contingents in the way that the semantic content of `Obama
visited Cuba as president' serves as the target proposition for Peter's wondering
whether Obama visited Cuba as president.31
3.2 Middlism
Consider again the evil scientist's promise. Things are a bit dierent if we accept
Middlism for future contingents because the evil scientist hasn't told me what
he will do i (NA24) is middle. Suppose he adds the following condition to his
promise: he will leave me alone and do nothing i (NA24) is middle; no torture,
30If Moira asserts it will rain tomorrow and Aidan says I wonder whether it will, it
seems that Aidan is wondering about the very thing that Moira is asserting. The proponent
of Falsism who responds in the way suggested here would need to deny this.
31I haven't made precise what I take a target proposition for a wondering whether attitude to
be but I think the following characterization suces: For polar, wondering whether attitudes,
proposition p is a target proposition for wondering whether Q just in case Q(p) or Q(not-p).
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no holiday. Given this promise, I would wonder whether the sodium-24 atom
will decay in the next 24 hours; I would fear that it will and hope that it will
not.
Like Falsism, Middlism appears to oer a therapy: In accepting the theory,
I come to know that (NA24) is middle and so I know the true, complete answer
to the question that serves as the content of my wondering. And so, by (WIN1)
I ought not wonder. But I do continue to wonder, and my wondering certainly
seems appropriate. This raises a problem for Middlism.
The Middlist might respond that she is in a better position to respond to this
diculty than the Falsist. There are two general strategies that the Middlist
might adopt in response. The rst is to claim that when a true, complete answer
to Q is `a' is middle, it is still appropriate to wonder whether Q and so (WIN1)
needs to be revised: there are cases where one knows the true, complete answer
to Q, yet it is still appropriate to wonder whether Q. It is precisely the nature of
a proposition being middle that makes it indeterminate and thereby appropriate
to wonder about the corresponding question. The second strategy is to claim
that knowing that `a' is middle does not involve knowing Q 's true, complete
answer. This strategy does not need to reject or revise (WIN1) since learning
that a proposition is middle does not involve learning a question's true, complete
answer.
It is worth noting that neither of these two strategies seem plausible when we
consider other candidate propositions to which we might assign the truth-value
middle. A natural such candidate would be in the case of vagueness. Suppose
Larry is a borderline case of bald and suppose we adopt Middlism for vagueness
and the truth-value of the proposition that Larry is bald is middle. Suppose
that initially Susan doesn't know anything about how much hair Larry has; she's
never met him or seen a picture of him. And so she wonders whether Larry is
bald where the content of her wondering is the question L: Is Larry bald?. In
such a case, Susan is aware of the possible, complete answers to L but she does
not know which of the possible, complete answers is the true answer.32 Suppose
Susan then learns that `Larry is bald' is middle. Both ways of responding
mentioned in the previous paragraph seem implausible in light of Susan's new
knowledge. If we grant that `Larry is bald' is middle is the true, complete
32Given that we are investigating whether wondering whether is appropriate on a given
theory, let us suppose Middlism for vagueness and that Susan knows this is the correct account
of vagueness. So the possible, complete answers are: `Larry is bald' is true, `Larry is bald' is
false, and `Larry is bald' is middle.
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answer to L, it seems implausible to maintain that continuing to wonder is
appropriate given this knowledge. In learning this proposition, Susan's inquiry
has come to an end, just as if she had learned that `Larry is bald' is true. There
is nothing more to learn. There would be something defective were Susan to
continue to investigate whether Larry is bald after learning that `Larry is bald'
is middle is the true, complete answer to L. The second strategy for responding
also seems implausible. What grounds are there for denying that in knowing
that `Larry is bald' is middle Susan fails to know the true, complete answer to
L? Presumably, the Middlist would agree that Larry is bald' is middle' is true.
Could the Middlist deny that it is a complete answer? This seems implausible
on a Middlist approach to vagueness. I think our concept of a complete answer
to a question is tied to the concept of inquiry. In coming to know a complete
answer, inquiry comes to an end. So to the extent that we think Susan's inquiry
has come to an end in learning that `Larry is bald' is middle, this suggests that
`Larry is bald' is middle is a complete answer to the question Is Larry bald?
And so neither strategy seems plausible when considering a Middlist approach
to vagueness.
Note how we would model Susan's initial wondering whether Larry is bald.
It involves wondering which of the possible, complete answers: `Larry is bald' is
true, `Larry is bald' is middle, `Larry is bald' is false is the correct answer to L.
And once Susan learns that `Larry is bald' is middle, her inquiry comes to an
end. But this model cannot be applied in the case of wondering about future
contingents since, once one accepts Middlism for future contingents, (NA24) is
true and (NA24) is false are ruled out as possible answers to N. Just as com-
ing to know that `Larry is bald' is middle makes it inappropriate for Susan to
continue to wonder whether L, coming to know that (NA24) is middle seems
to make it inappropriate to continue to wonder whether N. Of course it is open
to the Middlist to claim that wondering about future contingents is wholly dif-
ferent than wondering about vague propositions, but considering the case of
vagueness suggests that wondering whether in cases of indeterminacy is plau-
sibly understood as wondering what truth-value a given proposition has, and
learning the truth-value renders further wondering inappropriate. The Middlist
who insists that wondering about future contingents is appropriate would need
to give this up: knowing what truth-value a proposition, p, has is compatible
with wondering whether p. It is worth noting the oddity in accepting this. For
a Middlist to wonder whether it will rain tomorrow is not for her to wonder
whether it is true that it will rain tomorrow. She knows that it is not true that
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it will rain tomorrow, yet she wonders whether it will rain.33 An utterance of `I
know that it is not true that it will rain tomorrow and I wonder whether it will'
certainly sounds defective, but should be assertable if knowing what truth-value
a future contingent has is compatible with wondering about it. Furthermore,
Middlists shouldn't hesitate to accept a bet that it is not true that it will rain
tomorrow (and shouldn't hesitate to accept a bet that it is not false that it will).
One might have thought that introducing an intermediate truth-value provides
a way of modelling our ignorance of future contingents, but once we recognize
that ignorance and wondering are plausibly understood as ignorance and won-
dering about what truth-value a proposition has, we realise that introducing
an intermediate truth-value undermines, rather than vindicates, our wondering
about future contingents.
3.3 Supervaluationism
Let us again consider the evil scientist's promise. A natural way of understand-
ing the promise on the Supervaluationist account is to take it as involving truth
and falsity as dened on the account. Suppose the evil scientist promises that
he will torture me i (NA24) is true and send me on a holiday i (NA24) is false.
Given such a promise, wondering would clearly be inappropriate. Knowing that
(NA24) is a future contingent, I know that it is satised in some histories and
unsatised in others. So I know that (NA24) is not true, and so I know that
I will not be tortured.34 And so understanding the promise in this way makes
wondering about future contingents inappropriate.
How else might the Supervaluationist explain the appropriateness of won-
dering about future contingents? Interestingly, for a Supervaluationist, betting
that the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow is not the same as betting that
it is true that the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow.35 Given that (NA24)
is a future contingent, a Supervaluationist would be foolish to take the second
bet. What about the rst? Given the nonequivalence between φ and φ is true,
what if we take my wondering to be not whether it is true that the sodium-24
33This means rejecting the transparency of truth with respect to wondering: Assuming one
has the concept of truth, wondering whether p is to wonder whether p is true. Kalderon (1997:
477) states the transparency of truth as entailing "if we posses the concept of truth, then in
asserting, believing, inquiring after the proposition expressed by S we assert, believe, inquire
after the proposition expressed by It is true that S."
34By similar reasoning I can come to know that I will not be sent on a wonderful holiday.
35The Supervaluationist rejects the transparency of truth with respect to wondering (See
footnote 32). However, unlike the Middlist, rejecting transparency for the truth-predicate is
a bullet the Supervaluationist is already committed to biting.
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atom will decay tomorrow, but rather whether the sodium-24 atom will decay
tomorrow? Given the Supervaluationist account of future contingents, would
wondering be appropriate in this case?
Let us consider when wondering is appropriate given a Supervaluationist
treatment of vagueness. Consider Susan's wondering whether Larry is bald.
Initially, before she knows anything about Larry, her wondering is appropriate
and this can be accommodated on the Supervaluationist framework by claiming
that there are three possible, complete answers to her question L: `Larry is bald'
is true, `Larry is bald' is false, and `Larry is bald' is neither true nor false. The
question is also sound since one of the possible, complete answers is true. Once
Susan learns that Larry is a borderline case, her inquiry seems to come to an
end, and given the Supervaluationist framework, it no longer seems appropriate
for her to wonder whether Larry is bald. According to Supervaluationism, there
is simply no further fact of the matter to uncover. That there is no fact of the
matter makes it dicult to see how one could appropriately wonder about it.
As Hartry Field notes To put the matter more pointedly, the functional import
of the notion of "no fact of the matter" is supposed to include this: for anyone
who believes that there is no fact of the matter as to whether A, it would be
pointless and misguided to wonder whether A, or to hope that A, or anything
like that (Field 2015: 165). If we accept the Supervaluationist account of future
contingents, then we are not in a situation like the one that Susan is initially
in when she appropriately wonders whether Larry is bald. Rather we are in a
situation like the one that Susan is in after she learns that Larry is a borderline
case; all future contingents are borderline cases. There is simply no fact of
the matter about whether the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow. Just as
it seems inappropriate for Susan to continue to wonder whether Larry is bald
once she learns that he is a borderline case and there is no further fact of the
matter, so it seems inappropriate to wonder about future contingents once we
accept that there is no further fact of the matter.
The Supervaluationist about future contingents may respond as follows: the
indeterminacy involved in future contingents is of a fundamentally dierent sort
than the indeterminacy involved in vagueness.36 Todd and Rabern endorse
this line in a dierent context when they write, The indeterminacy involved
with the future involves a dynamic aspect that has no analogue with respect
to vaguenessin the vagueness case, there is no waiting around to see how
36A similar response could be given by the Middlist. However, I do not think it would
succeed for reasons similar to those I provide against the Supervaluationist response below.
21
the indeterminacy gets resolved (Todd and Rabern 2019: fn. 23)37. Belnap,
Perlo, and Xu (2001) provide a similar response to the challenge that wondering
raises for their account of future contingents when they write:
It may seem that if at moment m it is sensible to wonder whether
A, then it must be that either A is settled true at m, or that A is
settled false at m. More generally, it may seem that if one is to
be able, at m, properly to raise the question whether A, then A
must be either settled true or settled false...No matter how things
eventuate, the question posed on Monday, Will there be a sea battle
tomorrow? will be answered. If there is a sea battle on Tuesday,
then we may say, The answer to the question is denitely `yes'.;
while if on Tuesday there is no sea battle, then we may say, The
answer to the question is denitely `no'. We should therefore not
reject the Monday question as badly posed. It is perfectly correct
on Monday to say something like We cannot yet provide a settled
answer to that question, but must wait and see (Belnap, Perlo,
and Xu 2001, 176).
The response seems to be that the fact that the indeterminacy will be resolved
makes wondering about the target proposition appropriate.38 However, upon
reection, it becomes apparent that this response fails to move beyond the orig-
inal diculty of why it is appropriate to wonder about future contingents on
the Supervaluationist account. Consider the initial worry concerning wondering
about future contingents on the Supervaluationist account: the objector fails to
see how the account renders it appropriate to wonder whether the sodium-24
atom will decay tomorrow. He notes that, according to the account, we can
know that it is not true that it will, and we can know that it is not false that
it will. Furthermore, just as it is inappropriate to continue to wonder whether
Larry is bald once we learn that there is no fact of the matter about whether
he is bald, so it is is inappropriate to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom
will decay once we learn there is no fact of the matter about whether it will.
37As an anonymous referee for this journal points out, it is not the case that the indeter-
minacy of all future contingents will be resolved. Suppose that `Jesus will return someday'
expresses a future contingent, time never ends, and for every future time, t, Jesus fails to
return at t. In such a case, there is no future time at which the indeterminacy of the future
contingent gets resolved. This example is based on one that Barnes and Cameron (2011: 5)
consider and reply to.
38However this doesn't help with future contingents like the one mentioned in footnote 37.
It seems that one could appropriately wonder whether Jesus will return someday even in a
world in which time never ends and Jesus never returns.
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The Supervaluationist then responds that in the case of future contingents it
is appropriate to wonder because, unlike the vagueness case, there will be a
determinate fact of the matter. But if the objector has trouble seeing how it
is appropriate to wonder whether the sodium-24 atom will decay tomorrow, he
will also have trouble seeing how it is appropriate to wonder what the deter-
minate fact of the matter will be.39 In fact, wondering whether the sodium-24
atom will decay, on the Supervaluationist account, seems indistinguishable from
wondering what the determinate fact of the matter will be. So one who has dif-
culty in understanding why wondering about the former future contingent is
appropriate on the account will also have diculty understanding why wonder-
ing about the latter future contingent is appropriate on the account. This wait
and see response answers the challenge of why wondering about future contin-
gents is appropriate by oering up another future contingent, and thereby fails
to make progress in explaining why it is appropriate to wonder about them.
3.4 A General Non-Ockhamist Response?
There is a general reply to the problem I have raised for wondering about the
future that is similar in spirit to the one just considered and is available to all
three non-Ockhamist views discussed above. The reply involves maintaining
that true, complete answers to questions concerning future contingent events
change over time.40 Knowing the present, true, complete answer to a question
about a future contingent event does not make it inappropriate to have the
question as the content of one's wondering attitude. Given that a true, complete
answer to the question can change, one can appropriately wonder what the
true, complete answer will be even if one knows what the true, complete answer
39It is worth noting that if we take the content of the wondering attitude to be the question
What will the determinate fact of the matter be?, it appears to have two possible complete
answers: It will be true that the sodium-24 atom decays tomorrow and It will be false that the
sodium-24 atom decays to tomorrow. However, neither of these possible, complete answers to
the question are true. Rather, they are neither true nor false since they are satised in some
of the relevant histories and unsatised in others. Given that neither of the possible, complete
answers are true, the corresponding question is unsound. So if we take the question that serves
as the content of the wondering to be What will the determinate fact of the matter be? and
accept Supervaluationism for future contingents, wondering would be inappropriate in virtue
of violating (WIN2). No progress has been made in taking this question as the content of the
wondering.
40The reply being considered here commits its proponent to the interrogative analogue of
temporalism for propositions. According to temporalism, a proposition like the poker is hot
is true at some times and false at other times, rather than being true (or false) eternally.
Temporalism for questions would be the view that questions have true, complete answers
relative to times, and what serves as a true, complete answer to a question at one time may
not serve as a true, complete answer at another time.
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presently is. The main problem raised by WIN1 for wondering about future-
contingents can be avoided by modifying WIN1 as follows (where `t1' and `t2'
denote distinct times):
(WIN1*) Necessarily, if Q is a question pertaining to time t2 and one knows
at t1 a true, complete answer-at-t2 to Q, then one ought not wonder
at t1 whether Q.41
Consider the case in which I wonder on Monday whether the sodium-24 atom will
decay in the next 24 hours. The suggestion is that (WIN1*) is compatible with
the appropriateness of my wondering because I fail to know the true, complete
answer-at-Tuesday to the question of whether the sodium-24 atom decays.
However, I do not think this response succeeds, for similar reasons to those
given in reply to the wait-and-see response above. According to the current
framework, wondering whether involves one having a question as the content
of one's attitude. According to the response at hand, what might we take the
question that serves as the content of my wondering to be? Presumably, it is
a question about the answer-at-Tuesday to the question Does the sodium-24
atom decay?. We might state it as follows: What will the answer-at-Tuesday be
to the question `Does the sodium-24 atom decay?'. But this question is itself
a question concerning a future contingent: I wonder of the question Does the
sodium-24 atom decay? what its true, complete answer-at-Tuesday will be.
The response answers the challenge of why it is appropriate to wonder about
future contingents by oering up another future contingent which faces the
same diculties as the original. To see this, note that, according to the non-
Ockhamist accounts considered above, I can know on Monday that the true,
complete answer-at-Tuesday to Does the sodium-24 atom decay? is not The
sodium-24 atom decays because if it were, then it would be true on Monday
that the sodium-24 atom will decay, and all three non-Ockhamist theories deny
this. So again, this response does not seem to make progress in explaining why
it is appropriate to wonder about future contingents on these non-Ockhamist
accounts.
Here is another way of stating the problem with this non-Ockhamist re-
sponse. Presumably, the proponent of this response would accept the following
biconditional (where `o' denotes an object, `F ' denotes a property and `t ' de-
notes a future time):
41I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this general line of response and this modied
version of (WIN1).
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 It will be the case that o is F at t i a true, complete answer-at-t to the
question Is o F at t? is that o is F at t.
To reject such a biconditional would suggest that the account fails to provide
a correct analysis of will-claims. However, in accepting this biconditional, it
becomes clear that the right-hand side inherits the same diculties that the
left-hand side faces with respect to wondering about the future. Consider the
Falsist, for example. She claims that in the case of future contingents, the left-
hand side of the biconditional is false and so, in accepting the biconditional,
she commits herself to maintaining that the right-hand side is false as well.
This leaves us with the same problem with respect to wondering about future
contingents that was raised in section 4.1: If one knows that it is false that
the true, complete answer-at-t to the question Is o F at t? is that o is F
at t, why is it appropriate to wonder about it? Noting the non-Ockhamist's
commitment to the above biconditional shows that the proposed response does
not make progress in explaining the appropriateness of wondering about future
contingents.
3.5 Ockhamism
Ockhamism stands in sharp contrast to the three accounts considered above in
that it allows for a straightforward and uniform treatment of wondering about
future contingents and wondering more generally. Friedman's framework seam-
lessly extends to future contingents and treats them in the same way as won-
dering about past and present events. Furthermore, and central to the goal of
this paper, it explains why wondering about future contingents is appropriate.
Suppose there was another sodium-24 atom on May 14, 1984 and I now won-
der whether it decayed before midnight on May 15, 1984. The content of my
wondering whether attitude is the question: Did the sodium-24 atom decay on
May 15, 1984? and it has two possible complete answers: It decayed on May
15, 1984 and It did not decay on May 15, 1984. Furthermore, it has a true,
complete answer and so the question is sound. In being ignorant of the true,
complete answer, my wondering is appropriate. Wondering about future con-
tingents like (NA24) is given the same treatment. It has two possible complete
answers and one of them is true. My ignorance about the true, complete answer
makes my wondering appropriate.
One might respond But isn't there an asymmetry between the past and the
future? Isn't the past xed and the future open? So, shouldn't there be an
25
asymmetry in wondering about the future versus wondering about the past? I
agree that there are various asymmetries between the past and the future, and
some underlie an asymmetry in mental attitudes, but it is not clear that there is
such an asymmetry in our wondering whether attitudes. Relief, regret, anticipa-
tion, and fear are all plausibly temporally asymmetric attitudes. For example, if
Susan regrets not sending Mia a card for her birthday, and then learns that Mia's
birthday is not until next month, it is inappropriate for her to continue to regret
not sending Mia a card for her birthday (even if Susan knows she is bad about
sending cards and knows she will not send her one next month). But wondering
whether doesn't seem to be temporally asymmetric in this way. The following
three considerations support the conclusion that wondering whether attitudes
about future events are much like wondering whether attitudes about past and
present events. The rst is that in the case of temporally asymmetric attitudes
like relief and anticipation, learning how we are temporally related to the event
in question has a signicant impact on the attitude. This does not seem to
be the case for wondering whether. We can wonder whether a particular event
occurs without knowing (or caring) whether the event is in our future. Discov-
ering that the event lies in our future does not appear to aect our wondering
whether attitude in the way that it does with other temporally asymmetric at-
titudes like relief and anticipation. Suppose Wanda wonders whether Serena
Williams wins the 2021 US Open. Due to her preoccupation with other things
and the disarray of the tournament calendar due to Covid, Wanda is unaware of
whether the 2021 US Open has already taken place. Finding out that the 2021
US Open hasn't happened yet does not alter her attitude of wondering whether
Serena Williams wins. It would be entirely appropriate for her to continue to
wonder whether Serena Williams wins were she to discover that the 2021 US
Open hasn't happened yet. In contrast, it would have a signicant impact on
her attitude of anticipation of the event: learning that it hasn't happened yet
may lead her to adopt an attitude of anticipation towards the event.
A second related consideration is that cases of past+future wondering seem
natural and unproblematic in a way that would be surprising if our attitude
of wondering about the future was signicantly dierent than our attitude of
wondering about the past or present. By past+future wondering I have in mind
cases of wondering about a proposition that is in part about the past and in
part about the future. Consider a farmer who is away from home and at midday
wonders whether it rains back home today. For the sake of his crops, he wonders
whether today contains rain. The interval that he wonders about is in part in
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his past and in part in his future. If wondering about the future was fundamen-
tally dierent than wondering about the past, we would expect such cases of
past+future wondering to be problematic or at least awkwardly disjunctive; but
they don't seem to be. Contrast this with the oddity of the farmer at midday
adopting the attitude of anticipation towards today containing rain. He might
anticipate news that it rained at some point today, but anticipating rain today,
when the day is already half over, seems odd.
Thirdly, the same considerations that motivate (WIN1) and (WIN2) in the
case of wondering about the past and present also apply to wondering about
the future, suggesting that wondering about the future has the same normative
prole as past and present wondering. As noted previously, an assertion of `I
know that James will attend the party and I wonder whether he will' sounds
defective in a similar way in which `I know that James attended the party and I
wonder whether he did' does. Furthermore, knowing that a question about the
future is unsound makes it inappropriate to wonder about it in the same way
that knowing a question about the past is unsound makes it inappropriate to
wonder about it. Knowing that the party this evening has been cancelled makes
it inappropriate to wonder whether James will attend, just as knowing that
the party last night was cancelled makes it inappropriate to wonder whether
James attended. That the same norms seem to apply to wondering about the
future as to wondering about the past and present further suggests that there
is no deep temporal asymmetry in our wondering whether attitudes. These
considerations suggest that it is appropriate to wonder about the future in just
those conditions in which it is appropriate to wonder about the past: when
there is a true, complete answer to the question that serves as the content of
our wondering and we are ignorant what the true complete answer is. Only
Ockhamism can render wondering about the future appropriate in the same
way as wondering about the past and present.
4 Conclusion
So what does this reection on wondering about future contingents establish?
I think reecting on the nature of wondering whether involves an implicit as-
sumption that the question that serves as the content of the attitude is sound:
the question has a true, complete answer and wondering whether is appropriate
only if we fail to know what the true, complete answer is. Ockhamism, un-
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like the other accounts of future contingents that we considered, vindicates our
wondering about the future by entailing that our interrogative attitudes about
the future are sound, and the account doesn't allow us to deduce their true,
complete answer. Oftentimes, alternatives to the Ockhamist account of future
contingents are motivated by appeal to an asymmetry in our mental attitudes
about the future; the openness and uncertainty of the future requires a rejec-
tion or modication of bivalence. But I hope to have shown that reecting on
wondering pulls in the opposite direction. When we wonder about the future,
we assume that there is an unknown, yet true answer to our question, and this
is what makes our wondering about the future appropriate. The alternatives
to Ockhamism considered here have diculty accommodating these aspects of
wondering. Of course, nothing I have said here provides an argument for the
conclusion that Ockhamism is true. It may well be that the metaphysics of time
is such that no future contingents are true and one of the alternative accounts
considered above is correct. If that's the case, then our natural tendency to
wonder about the future is epistemically inappropriate.42
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